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I. INTRODUCTION 
What do Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, Sally Susman, Executive Vice 
President of Corporate Affairs at Pfizer, and Alex Schultz, Vice 
President of Growth at Facebook, all have in common?  In many states, 
each of these important American business leaders could lose their job 
simply because of their sexual orientation.1  These leaders are but three 
of the innumerable examples of LGBTQ employees and their 
contributions to American businesses and society in general.  Yet, for 
these businesspeople, and LGBTQ employees all over the United States, 
a simple move across state lines could mean the loss of Title VII 
protection.  This inequality is due to the differing interpretations of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the circuit courts.2  A gay man 
employed in Indiana cannot be fired because he is married to a man.  
But, if that same man began working in Florida, he could be fired based 
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 1.   James Cook, Apple CEO Tim Cook Has Explained in a Heartfelt Speech Why he Came 
Out as Gay, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:29 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-ceo-
tim-cook-gay-human-rights-campaign-speech-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/EUG5-W7L9]; Jillian 
D’onfro & Tess Danielson, Power Players: The Most Important Facebook Execs You’ve Never 
Heard of, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 11, 2015, 4:30 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-
important-facebook-execs-youve-never-heard-of-2015-9/#alex-schultz-is-behind-facebooks-
staggering-user-stats-6 [https://perma.cc/5ZKC-7TVJ]; Stephanie Sandberg, The New Supermodels 
— How Out LBT+ Women in Business Drive Impact, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2017, 5:50 PM, 
updated Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-new-supermodels-how-out-lbt-
women-in-business_us_58 
fe5eb2e4b0f420ad99cad2 [https://perma.cc/Z3SJ-JKUX]. 
 2.   Compare Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345–49 (7th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (holding discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title VII), with Evans v. Ga. 
Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding Title VII does not protect sexual 
orientation discrimination), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). 
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on his sexuality despite the fact that Title VII is the law of the land in 
both states.3  LGBTQ individuals should be just as free to live and work 
in any of the fifty states as straight individuals. 
Since 1964, the Civil Rights Act has protected Americans from 
discrimination in a wide range of areas.  Specifically, Title VII of the Act 
protects against discrimination by employers based on a range of 
immutable characteristics, including race and sex.4  However, as 
traditional notions of sex and gender change, courts have failed to 
interpret the prohibition on sex discrimination contained in Title VII 
consistently.5  In April 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, sitting en banc, 
overruled an earlier decision of a three-judge panel and held that Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination protects employees from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.6  This decision created a 
circuit split over whether the prohibition on sex discrimination extends to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.7 
Title VII makes it unlawful: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.8 
While some courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Hively and the Second 
Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., hold that this language 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation,9 others, like the 
Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, hold that the 
Act only prohibits discrimination based on sex only in the narrowest 
                                                            
 3.   See cases cited supra note 2. 
 4.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 5.   Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–49, with Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255–57. 
 6.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 7.   Compare id. (Title VII protects employees from sexual orientation discrimination), with 
Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (finding Title VII does not cover sexual orientation discrimination), and 
Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same), 
abrogated by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 8.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 9.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 341; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108. 
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sense.10  These courts reason that the legislature never intended for Title 
VII to apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation and that the 
plain meaning of the text does not imply any level of protection for 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual employees.11  This view is fundamentally 
flawed not only from a policy and human rights standpoint, but also from 
a statutory interpretation standpoint.12  The Second and Seventh Circuits’ 
interpretation of Title VII fulfills the goals of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 more adequately and not only fits with the plain meaning of the 
statute, but also with the previous interpretations of Title VII by the 
Supreme Court.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court should adopt this 
interpretation. 
Part II of this Comment lays out the important terminology and 
definitions that are used throughout its discussion of Title VII.  Part III 
explores the background of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
in general and the background of the circuit split.  Part IV explores 
multiple theories of statutory construction, which indicate that Title VII 
should, in fact, protect against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  Lastly, Part V offers a brief conclusion of the arguments 
presented in this Comment. 
II. ON TERMINOLOGY: SEX, GENDER AND TITLE VII 
Today, many people agree that “gender” and “sex” do not share a 
common definition.  Merriam-Webster defines sex as “either of the two 
major forms of individuals that occur in many species and that are 
distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis of 
their reproductive organs and structures,”13 and defines gender as “the 
behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits typically associated with one 
                                                            
 10.   850 F.3d at 1255–57.  
 11.   Id. at 1255–56 (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)) 
(stating only the conclusion that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation-based discrimination 
and relying on the statement made in Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 
1978), that “Congress by its proscription of sex discrimination intended only to guarantee equal job 
opportunities for males and females”); Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d at 199 (citing Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000)).  In Simonton, the court noted that “[a]lthough 
congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is not always a helpful guide, 
Congress’s refusal to expand the reach of Title VII is strong evidence of congressional intent in the 
face of consistent judicial decisions refusing to interpret ‘sex’ to include sexual orientation.”  232 
F.3d at 35. 
 12.   Infra Sections IV.B.1, 5. 
 13.   Sex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sex [https://per 
ma.cc/8Z5F-E8KC] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
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sex.”14  In other words, sex refers to a person’s biological characteristics 
while gender refers to the traits society stereotypically associates with 
those biological characteristics.15  Title VII refers only to discrimination 
based on “sex,” but the Supreme Court has already interpreted this to 
encompass discrimination based on gender—that is, the extent to which 
one conforms with the traits stereotypically associated with their 
gender.16  Thus, in discussing Title VII and its application, courts often 
use the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably not because these 
courts feel that one’s gender is necessarily the same as one’s sex, but 
rather because, as used in Title VII, the term “sex” encompasses both the 
biological sex of a person as well as the gender identity of that 
individual.17  This Comment adopts the same approach in discussing 
Title VII.  When the discussion is outside of the scope of Title VII, this 
Comment uses “sex” and “gender” as defined in this Comment. 
Additionally, while the content of this Comment certainly relates to 
the LGBTQ community as a whole, it addresses only the claims of 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals.18  This Comment is not intended 
to address the related and important, but separate, jurisprudence and legal 
issues concerning transgender individuals.  However, there are many 
other sources available for such studies.19 
                                                            
 14.   Gender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender [https: 
//perma.cc/NT9T-C847] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 15.   See Sex Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 16.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); infra Section III.B. 
 17.   See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 372 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (using “gender” interchangeably with “sex” in stating that Title VII “§§ 2000e-2(a)–(d), 
which proscribe discrimination ‘because of’ race, color, religion, gender, or national origin”); 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “[i]n this case, Ledbetter carried the burden of persuading the jury that the pay disparity 
she suffered was attributable to intentional sex discrimination” and also that “Ledbetter proved to the 
jury the following: She was a member of a protected class; she performed work substantially equal 
to work of the dominant class (men); she was compensated less for that work; and the disparity was 
attributable to gender-based discrimination”) (emphasis added); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (“We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender 
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability 
only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even 
if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”). 
 18.   LGBTQ includes transgender, intersex and asexual individuals, as well as any other person 
who does not identify as male or female based on the traditional binary view of gender. 
 19.   See generally Taylor Alyse Pack Ellis, Comment, Why the EEOC got it Right in Macy v. 
Holder: The Argument for Transgender Inclusion in Title VII Interpretation, 16 SCHOLAR: ST. 
MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 375 (2014) (arguing that Title VII prohibits discrimination towards 
transgender individuals); Jason Lee, Comment, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying 
Transgender Employment Discrimination under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423 (2012) 
(discussing legal theories that could be used to allow transgender individuals to bring cognizable 
Title VII claims). 
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Finally, concerning pronouns, this Comment uses the preferred 
pronouns of the people discussed when available.  Because this 
Comment addresses only those cases where the claimant identifies as 
either male or female, where the gender identity of a person or class of 
persons is unknown, his/her pronouns are used. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The background of Title VII and the jurisprudence interpreting it is a 
vital part of understanding how and why Title VII applies to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Section III.A first considers 
the origin of Title VII’s prohibition because of sex and its effect on 
interpretation.  Second, Section III.B considers the more modern 
application of Title VII to gender nonconformity and sexual orientation-
related issues.  Then, Section III.C provides an overview of Hively and 
other cases where courts have recognized protection for lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition.  
Finally, Section III.D explores the opposing argument in cases like 
Omnicom and Evans. 
A. The Misunderstood History of Title VII’s Sex Discrimination 
Prohibition 
The legislative history (or lack thereof) of Title VII’s prohibition on 
sex discrimination has often been used in interpreting the statute, usually 
to the effect of narrowing the scope of protection under the Act.20  In its 
earliest form, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not even 
mention discrimination based on sex; instead Congress originally 
intended that the Act focus primarily on race.21  The “sex amendment,” 
added only days before the vote on the bill, was originally “proposed by 
conservative opponents of the civil rights legislation who believed that it 
would lead to the defeat of the entire bill.”22  This bit of legislative 
history is both misleading and extremely important to the analysis of 
                                                            
 20.   Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s 
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of 
ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342 (2014) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984), which relied on a “dearth of legislative 
history” in finding Title VII did not cover transgender individuals). 
 21.   Id. at 1338. 
 22.   Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History 
of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137 (1997) 
(quoting Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running 
the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 409 n.62 (1996)). 
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protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title 
VII because courts have often taken it out of context and misconstrued it, 
ignoring the actual intent of the amendment and used to restrict sex-
based protections under Title VII.23 
Courts and scholars have long viewed the addition of “sex” to Title 
VII’s list of protected classes as a congressional joke, made in an effort 
only to kill the bill entirely.24  While this may have been the initial view 
of the conservative Congressman who originally proposed the 
amendment, it is not the full story.25  Instead, “[a]ny attempt to add a sex 
amendment would have had to overcome a nearly overwhelming number 
of legislators willing to vote it down with little notice.  Thus, the sex 
discrimination amendment could not have been added without strong 
multi-factional support.”26  Although Congressman Smith, who 
introduced the amendment, would have preferred to kill the bill 
altogether because of his racist views, it is also true that if the bill were to 
pass, he wanted sex added as a protected category.27  In fact, Smith had 
sponsored an Equal Rights Amendment for more than twenty years, and 
he supported the National Woman’s Party.28  Further, the women in the 
House of Representatives were extremely serious in their support of the 
amendment.29 
Interestingly, the supporters of the sex amendment, whether 
conservative Southern Congressmen or moderate Northern 
Congresswomen, shared a common goal of expanding protection under 
Title VII to women.30  This unlikely bipartisan support allowed the Act 
to pass despite the last minute change.31  Indeed, as Professor Case points 
out, “Representative Smith may have been a racist, but he did not want 
‘his’ women to take second place to men and women of other races,” and 
[f]or Representative Griffiths [a Congresswoman who supported the 
Civil Rights Act], black women were also an important intersectional 
                                                            
 23.   Id. at 142–45. 
 24.   Id. at 137. 
 25.   Id. at 137–38. 
 26.   Id. at 159. 
 27.   Id. at 149–53, 156–58. 
 28.   Case, supra note 20, at 1339. 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Id. at 1339–40. 
 31.   Id.; Bird, supra note 22, at 158 (“Congressional behavior . . . clearly points to the 
conclusion that Congress passed the sex amendment because of strong political forces seeking to 
further the cause of equality for women.  These political forces include the conservative [National 
Womans’ Party] that convinced Smith to issue the measure, and the pro-[amendment] feminists who 
argued in the debate.”) 
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category.  She stressed that black women needed a prohibition on sex 
discrimination were they to have any hope of equal employment 
opportunity and illustrated her point with examples from every class of 
employment.32 
Thus, Congress’s goal in passing Title VII with the sex amendment was 
not simply a political ploy, but rather an attempt to keep employers from 
disguising violations of the Act by simply discriminating based on a 
category not listed in the Act.33 Although a last-minute addition, the sex 
amendment proved to have anything but an insignificant impact. 
B. Price Waterhouse, Oncale, and the Expansion of Protection Under 
Title VII’s Sex Discrimination Prohibition 
As Americans’ views of women in the workplace, and gender in 
general, changed, the need to revisit the interpretation of the prohibition 
on sex discrimination grew.  Over the years, courts have expanded the 
scope of Title VII to apply to much more than the clear-cut “fired for 
being female” scenario.34  For example, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, the Court stated that “[w]ithout question, when a supervisor 
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that 
supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex,” rejecting the argument 
that the prohibition was intended only to protect against “tangible,” 
“economic” loss.35  Previously, in 1978, the Court in City of Los Angeles, 
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart reasoned that “[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”36  Reaffirming this 
decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins set the stage for the current 
debate surrounding the scope of Title VII’s protection for LGBTQ 
                                                            
 32.   Case, supra note 20, at 1340. 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986) (expanding Title 
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition to hostile work environment claims); Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1983) (holding that a company 
insurance plan that fully covered female employees’ pregnancy costs but which limited pregnancy 
cost coverage for the spouses of male employees violates Title VII); City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (finding a pension plan requiring female 
employees to make greater contributions than male employees because women statistically live 
longer than men violates Title VII as relying on sex stereotypes).  
 35.   477 U.S. at 64 (alterations in original). 
 36.   435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 
(7th Cir. 1971)). 
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individuals.37 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Price Waterhouse accounting 
partnership denied Ann Hopkins, a female senior manager, a promotion 
after many of the partners took issue with her less-than-feminine 
qualities.38  Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII.39  While 
none of the partners explicitly suggested that Price Waterhouse deny 
Hopkins partnership because she was a woman, negative comments were 
overwhelmingly sex-based, under the guise of a critique of her 
“interpersonal skills.”40  Despite the fact that Hopkins had secured a $25 
million contract with the Department of State, which was described as 
“an outstanding performance” by some partners, others suggested that 
Hopkins was too abrasive.41  One partner further stated that Hopkins 
could improve her chances at partnership by walking, talking, and 
dressing “more femininely,” wearing makeup, and having her hair 
done.42  This statement does not necessarily imply that the mere fact of 
being a woman entirely barred a person from partnership at Price 
Waterhouse, especially because no one alleged that the firm denied all 
women partnership positions.43  In fact, it seemed that Price 
Waterhouse’s evaluating partners sought out more “feminine” 
behavior.44  Women who maintained a level of “femininity” at the firm 
were viewed favorably and able to succeed.45  However, women, like 
Hopkins, who did not adhere to traditional gender roles, were at a 
disadvantage in the Price Waterhouse partnership scheme.46  Although 
the mere fact of Hopkins’s sex was not necessarily the reason for her 
denial of partnership, sex stereotyping likely was.47  Thus, the Court in 
Hopkins’s case considered whether Title VII protects against this 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes, in addition to the most basic 
meaning of sex discrimination.48 
                                                            
 37.   See generally Camille Patti, Note, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the 
Battle but Winning the War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. 
& SEXUALITY 133, 135–36 (2017). 
 38.   490 U.S. 228, 232–35 (1989). 
 39.   Id. at 231–32. 
 40.   Id. at 234–35. 
 41.   Id. at 233–34. 
 42.   Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
 43.   Id. at 236. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Id. 
 46.   See id. at 236–37. 
 47.   Id. at 235–36. 
 48.   Id. at 250. 
2019 YOU BETTER WORK 639 
The Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation of Title VII 
put forth by Price Waterhouse.  Instead, it found that the text of Title VII 
means that “gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions,” and 
that “to construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-
for causation,’ as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them.”49  
Further the court held that “we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group” and that “an employer who acts 
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”50  This holding allows us 
to see that when an employer discriminates against an employee because 
of their sexual orientation, that employee is also a victim of sex 
stereotyping. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court further clarified Title VII’s sex 
discrimination provision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.  In 
Oncale, Joseph Oncale’s male supervisors repeatedly subjected him to 
sexual harassment while working on an oil platform.51  Oncale 
complained, but his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, took no 
remedial action against his harassers.52  After eventually quitting his job, 
Oncale sued Sundowner under Title VII, alleging that he faced 
discrimination because of his sex.53  The district court found that “Mr. 
Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by 
male co-workers” and granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed.54 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Title VII.55  The Oncale opinion revolved around the 
plain meaning of Title VII’s text.56  In the Court’s opinion, Justice Scalia 
reemphasized important precedent concerning the interpretation of Title 
VII.57  First, the “terms” and “conditions” referred to in the first section 
of the Act are not to be construed in the “narrow contractual sense” but 
rather to cover all disparate treatment in the workplace.58  Second, the 
language “because of . . . sex” appearing in both sections of the Act 
                                                            
 49.   Id. at 240. 
 50.   Id. at 250–51. 
 51.   523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998). 
 52.   Id. 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   Id. at 76–77 (quoting Oncale, 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 55.   Id. at 79. 
 56.   Case, supra note 20, at 1341–42. 
 57.   Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78. 
 58.   Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). 
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protects women as well as men.59  Importantly, Scalia responded directly 
to the argument that Congress did not intend Title VII to protect against 
same-sex harassment like the harassment Oncale experienced.  He 
explained “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of 
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”60  Some view Oncale as “a catalyst in finally pushing 
courts to reexamine their precedent on the coverage under Title VII of 
sexual minorities and gender-nonconforming employees in light of 
Hopkins.”61  Thus, Price Waterhouse’s broad interpretation of Title VII, 
combined with Oncale’s reassurance that it may protect against evils not 
considered in 1964, including same-sex harassment, creates a strong 
argument for sexual orientation protection.  Recently, courts have started 
to put these pieces together and articulate arguments for including sexual 
orientation in Title VII’s definition of “sex.” 
C. Hively, the EEOC, and the Modern Argument for Protection against 
Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation 
While most courts continue to rely on pre-Price Waterhouse 
precedent to hold that Title VII does not protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, since Oncale and Price Waterhouse, some 
courts have found that Title VII does allow this protection.  Most notable 
are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision in 
Baldwin v. Department of Transportation and the Seventh Circuit 
opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.62  
Additionally, the Second Circuit followed Hively’s path and endorsed 
Baldwin in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.63  These decisions represent a 
turn in Title VII interpretation in line with the precedent set in Oncale 
and Price Waterhouse, statutory construction, and the legislative intent 
of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. 
1. Baldwin and the EEOC’s Authority 
In Baldwin v. Department of Transportation, the EEOC broadly 
                                                            
 59.   Id. at 78 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 
(1983)). 
 60.   Id. at 79. 
 61.   Case, supra note 20, at 1342. 
 62.   Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, *2 (EEOC July 15, 2015); Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 63.   883 F.3d 100, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
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proclaimed that claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation are 
cognizable under Title VII.64  The EEOC noted that discrimination 
because of sexual orientation is a “sex-based consideration” under Title 
VII and is based on the employees’ failure to adhere to one of the most 
basic gender-based stereotypes: dating the opposite sex.65  In addition to 
this reasoning, the EEOC found that the Associational Theory used by 
courts to interpret Title VII’s prohibition on race discrimination points 
towards prohibition of sexual orientation-based discrimination.  The 
EEOC noted that Title VII’s prohibition on race-based discrimination 
extends protection to those in interracial relationship and prohibits 
discrimination based on the associates of an employee, as in the case of 
interracial marriages.66  Under Price Waterhouse, “Title VII ‘on its face 
treats each of the enumerated categories’—race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin—‘exactly the same.’”67  Therefore, the EEOC decided, 
just as discrimination based on the race of an employee’s partner is 
prohibited associational discrimination under Title VII, discrimination 
based on the sex of an employee’s partner is associational discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII.68  Further, “the Baldwin panel directly 
criticized federal courts for failing to re-examine sexual orientation 
discrimination under Title VII, providing the impetus for courts to revisit 
the issue.”69 
The EEOC’s decision in Baldwin does not bind federal courts 
interpreting Title VII.70  However, the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII 
may still be entitled to some level of deference by the Court.71  
Depending on the specific circumstances, courts may use one of two tests 
to determine the level of deference they should give to an executive 
agency’s interpretation of a statute.72  In cases where Congress has 
                                                            
 64.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5. 
 65.   Id. 
 66.   Id. at *6. 
 67.   Id. at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989)). 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   Patti, supra note 37, at 134–35. 
 70.   Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (“To some extent, the Court’s lack of deference to the EEOC is part of a 
broader picture: The Court has established a bifurcated structure of administrative deference that 
leaves much of the kind of interpretation that the EEOC most often engages in with the ‘power to 
persuade’ but not the ‘power to control.’” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944))); Patti, supra note 37, at 134–35. 
 71.   Patti, supra note 37, at 138. 
 72.   Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First 
Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 
451–52 (2013). See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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delegated authority to interpret a statute to an executive agency, courts 
use the Chevron deference test.73  Chevron consists of a two-part test for 
determining the level of deference courts should give to an executive 
agency’s interpretation of a statute.74  The Supreme Court held in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC that: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers . . . [and] the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.75 
Courts have generally used this test to address agency interpretations 
stemming from “notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.”76 
Further, a second test exists for use in those cases where Congress 
has not delegated authority—expressly or impliedly—to the executive 
agency: the Skidmore deference test.  Courts use this test because even 
when executive agency has not been delegated the authority to interpret a 
statue, the agency interpretation “constitute[s] a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.”77  In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court stated that 
courts should consider factors like “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade” in determining the weight given to an executive agency’s 
judgment.78  The level of deference given to an agency under the 
Skidmore test is weaker than that given under the Chevron test, and is 
usually applied to “a wide variety of agency interpretations, ranging from 
opinion letters addressed to specific disputes to more generally 
applicable policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines.”79 
                                                            
 73.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (noting the test applies “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers”). 
 74.   Id. at 842–43. 
 75.   Id. at 843 (citations omitted). 
 76.   Hart, supra note 70, at 1940. 
 77.   Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Hart, supra note 70, at 1941. 
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Despite these tests, the Court is generally hesitant to even address the 
level of deference that should be given to an agency much less actually 
give that deference to the agency.80  In fact, over the years, the Court has 
added what is often referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.”81  Step Zero 
addresses, as a threshold matter, whether agency interpretations should 
be analyzed under Chevron, as opposed to some lower standard.82  For 
example, in Christensen v. Harris County and United States v. Mead 
Corp., the Court determined “Chevron’s high level of deference applies 
only to agency interpretations that have the ‘force of law.’”83  The Court 
further complicated things in Barnhart v. Walton, which laid out factors 
used by the Court in deciding whether to apply the Chevron test.84  
However, despite the decisions in Mead and Christensen, the Court later 
applied the Chevron test to an EEOC interpretation without any mention 
of a “force of law” requirement.  In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 
the Court simply stated that “[s]ince Congress has not spoken 
exhaustively on threats to a worker’s own health, the agency regulation 
can claim adherence under the rule in Chevron . . . .”85 
Interestingly, the Court has never applied the Chevron deference test 
to an antidiscrimination case under Title VII, although it has applied the 
test to two antidiscrimination cases under the ADA and the ADEA, 
ultimately choosing to defer to the EEOC in one.86  The Supreme Court 
has frequently applied the Skidmore deference test to antidiscrimination 
cases, however, and “[i]n two Title VII cases, the Court devoted 
considerable discussion to the administrative deference question.”87  
Although neither of these cases found that the EEOC’s interpretation was 
entitled to deference, both cases “garnered a strong dissenting opinion 
that also applied the same Skidmore deference standard but reached a 
contrary conclusion as to the persuasiveness of the agency’s views.”88  
For example, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court examined an 
                                                            
 80.   Id. at 1942–43. 
 81.   Ryan H. Nelson, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII After Baldwin v. 
Foxx, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255, 259 (2015). 
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
 84.   Nelson, supra note 81, at 261. 
 85.   536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002). 
 86.   Hart, supra note 70, at 1944–45 (citing Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84 (deferring to the 
EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170 (1989) 
(declining to defer to the EEOC’s ADEA interpretation)). 
 87.   Id. at 1945. 
 88.   Id. 
644 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
EEOC interpretive guideline that construed Title VII’s ban on sex 
discrimination as requiring equal coverage for work loss from pregnancy 
and work loss from other temporary disabilities.89  Although the Court 
ultimately did not give deference to the interpretive guideline,90 Justice 
Brennan argued that the issue at hand was “a paradigm example of the 
type of complex economic and social inquiry that Congress wisely left to 
resolution by the EEOC pursuant to its Title VII mandate.”91 
2. Hively’s Reconsideration of Precedent 
In Hively, Kimberly Hively alleged that her employer, Ivy Tech 
Community College, denied her promotions for full-time employment 
because she was openly gay.92  Hively claimed that the discrimination 
she faced was a form of sex discrimination.93  Ivy Tech successfully 
moved for a dismissal claiming that Title VII does not protect employees 
from discrimination based on sexual orientation.94  The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the decision in a three-judge panel.95  Later, sitting en banc, the 
same court overturned the panel’s decision, creating the circuit split that 
exists today.96  The court in Hively specifically reasoned that its review 
of the case was justified to bring the circuit’s law into “conformity with 
the Supreme Court’s teachings.”97  Relying mainly on the sex-
stereotyping theory of sex discrimination used by the Supreme Court in 
Price Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit held that 
[A] policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does not 
affect every woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about 
the proper behavior for someone of a given sex. . . .  Any discomfort, 
disapproval, or job decision based on the fact that the complainant—
woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates or 
marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on 
sex.  That means that it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination, if it affects employment in one of the specified ways.98 
                                                            
 89.   Id. at 1945–46 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140 (1976)). 
 90.   Id. at 1946 (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142–43). 
 91.   Id. (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 92.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 93.   Id. 
 94.   Id. 
 95.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 701–02 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d en 
banc sub nom. Hively, 853 F.3d 339. 
 96.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52. 
 97.   Id. at 343. 
 98.   Id. 346–47. 
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However, this is not the only reasoning used by members of the 
Hively court.  In addition to majority’s finding that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation relies on sex stereotyping, both concurrences also 
examined the plain meaning of the text.99  In doing so, the concurring 
judges argued that it is entirely impossible to discriminate against an 
individual based on their sexual orientation without discriminating based 
on their sex.100  One could not, after all, deduce the sexual orientation of 
an employee without first considering that employee’s sex.101  Therefore, 
the Hively court held that Title VII not only prohibits discrimination 
based on sexual orientation because of the stereotyping interpretation in 
Price Waterhouse but also because of its plain meaning.  The EEOC’s 
position in Baldwin, as well as the court’s decision in Hively, summarize 
the modern arguments for protection against sexual orientation-based 
discrimination under Title VII. 
Similarly, in Zarda, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that 
claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation are cognizable 
under Title VII, overruling its previous cases on the matter.102  Altitude 
Express, a skydiving company, fired Donald Zarda, a skydiving 
instructor, after he mentioned that he was gay to a client.103  Zarda 
argued that all of the straight men at Altitude Express made comments 
about their sexuality, yet Altitude only punished him for such 
comments.104  This, Zarda said, was impermissible because Altitude 
discriminated against him based on his failure to adhere to sex 
stereotypes and because of his sexual orientation.105  The en banc court 
agreed, stating “[w]e now conclude that sexual orientation discrimination 
is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of 
sex discrimination.”106  The court emphasized that the primary factor to 
consider in deciding whether discrimination was “because of . . . sex” 
was whether “sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice.”107  Further, the various opinions in the case also included 
endorsements of the sex-stereotyping and associational analyses 
addressed below.108  The court focused on Supreme Court cases holding 
                                                            
 99.   Id. at 356 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 100.   Id. at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
 101.   Id. at 358. 
 102.   883 F.3d 100, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 103.   Id. at 108. 
 104.   Id. at 109. 
 105.   Id. 
 106.   Id. at 112. 
 107.   Id. at 111–12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). 
 108.   Id. at 119–28; see infra Sections IV.B.2–3. 
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that sex discrimination existed even where the employer considered 
factors other than sex in its decisions, and where the situation was likely 
not envisioned by the authors of Title VII, such as sexual harassment of 
men by other men.109  Zarda’s outcome further reaffirms that courts 
should reconsider Title VII analysis in light of the more recent Supreme 
Court cases on sex discrimination. 
D. Evans and the Modern Argument Against Protection for 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation 
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has found that Title VII 
does not apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation.  In Evans v. 
Georgia Regional Hospital and in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group Inc., 
the Eleventh and the Second Circuits, respectively, refused to allow 
claims under Title VII based on discrimination because of sexual 
orientation.110  These cases and their reasoning are discussed in detail 
below. 
In Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, Jameka Evans alleged that 
her employer, Georgia Regional Hospital, discriminated against her 
because she is a lesbian and that she did not conform to female gender 
stereotypes.111  At the hospital, Evans was harassed, denied equal pay, 
and physically assaulted until she quit her job.112  Evans sued the 
hospital, arguing Title VII prohibits discrimination based on failure to 
adhere to gender norms, including her sexual orientation, and that Title 
VII also prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation itself.113  
The Eleventh Circuit chose, in a rather unnatural manner, to treat these 
complaints as entirely separate.114  That is, the court recognized that Title 
VII prohibits discrimination based on failure to adhere to gender norms, 
but refused to acknowledge that the Act prohibits discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.115  This analysis likely stems from a 1979 case the 
court cited in its decision, which states “discharge for homosexuality is 
not prohibited by Title VII.”116  Notably, the court decided that 1979 case 
                                                            
 109.   Id. at 113–15. 
 110.   Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 
(2017); Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam), 
abrogated by Zarda, 883 F.3d 100. 
 111.   Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251. 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   Id. at 1252. 
 114.   See id. at 1253–55. 
 115.   Id. at 1253–55. 
 116.   Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per 
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before both Price Waterhouse and Oncale.  Yet, the court in Evans held 
that the Oncale and Price Waterhouse decisions did not change its 
analysis.117 
Before Zarda, the Second Circuit embarked on a similar path in its 
analysis of Omnicom.  In Omnicom, Matthew Christiansen, an openly 
gay man, alleged that he was subjected to a “pattern of humiliating 
harassment targeting his effeminacy and sexual orientation” by his 
supervisor.118  Christiansen brought a claim under Title VII stating that 
his employer discriminated against him based on his failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes, and a sexual orientation discrimination claim 
under New York law.119  Like the court in Evans, the Omnicom court 
found that it could not reconsider previous Circuit decisions absent an en 
banc review, and found, perhaps even more directly than in Evans, that 
“being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not constitute 
nonconformity with a gender stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable 
gender stereotyping claim.”120  The precedent cited to support the Second 
Circuit here specifically stated that Price Waterhouse “would not 
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all 
homosexual men are stereotypically feminine.”121  These cases, and 
others that have found Title VII does not protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, rely on precedent to work around the 
reasoning presented in Baldwin, Price Waterhouse, and Oncale.  The 
following Sections discuss the flaws in such analyses. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Considering the text of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s findings in 
Oncale and Price Waterhouse, it becomes clear that the Seventh Circuit 
in Hively properly interpreted the statute in finding that it prohibits 
                                                            
curiam)).  See also id. n.4 (noting that in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 
1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit precedent 
decided on or before September 30, 1979).  
 117.   Id. at 1256 (noting that as Oncale and Price Waterhouse did not directly address Title 
VII’s applicability to sexual orientation claims, they were distinguishable and did not compel the 
court to overrule its precedent).  
 118.   Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam), 
abrogated by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 119.   Id. at 198. 
 120.   Id. at 199, 201.  Rather, the test is based not on sexual orientation but whether a plaintiff’s 
actions comport with assumptions of the plaintiff’s gender (e.g., a more masculine or feminine man 
or a more masculine or feminine woman).  Id. at 200–01 (noting that the Price Waterhouse 
plaintiff’s sexual orientation was irrelevant). 
 121.   Id. at 200 (quoting Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
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sexual orientation discrimination.  This interpretation is preferable to that 
of Omnicom and Evans for four reasons.  First, the current precedent and 
analysis applied by courts denying sexual orientation protection under 
Title VII is faulty, inconsistent, and ignores the weight courts should 
give to the Baldwin decision.  Second, an analysis of the statutory 
construction of Title VII under Price Waterhouse and Oncale leads to the 
conclusion that the Act prohibits sexual orientation discrimination.  
Third, the legislative intent of the Act, and specifically the “because 
of . . . sex” language, supports a finding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is prohibited under the Act.  Finally, determining the 
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII has important policy 
implications including increasing consistency of protection for 
employees throughout the United States and of enforcement of Title VII. 
A. Fixing Flawed Analyses: Addressing the Problems of Precedent, 
Absurd Results, and Baldwin. 
Many of the federal courts addressing whether Title VII 
encompasses sexual orientation claims have failed to acknowledge the 
rationality of allowing this protection by simply relying on precedent and 
engaging in work-around analyses.122  Despite Price Waterhouse’s 
prohibition on sex stereotyping, courts continue to find ways to work 
around expanding the protection of Title VII, all of which are 
unsustainable and less reasonable than a Baldwin-style analysis.  First, 
the court may simply state that it cannot overrule its older precedent.123  
Second, the court may assume that all Title VII claims by lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual plaintiffs are sexual orientation claims disguised as sex-
stereotyping claims and be hesitant to hear them.124  Or finally, the court 
may engage in an unusual analysis of describing gay or lesbian 
stereotypes and refusing to hear cases addressing discrimination based 
solely on those stereotypes.125  In addition, none of these courts have 
                                                            
 122.   See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating the court 
could not overturn precedent absent an en banc or Supreme Court decision overruling the past case), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017); Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d at 199 (same). 
 123.   See, e.g., id.; Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 
2003), abrogated by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  
Although the Hamm court never explicitly stated its inability to overturn precedent, it did not 
analyze the continued viability of that precedent. 
 124.   See, e.g., Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1065 (“Unlike Doe and Azteca, where the plaintiffs presented 
additional evidence that the harassment implicated sex rather than sexual orientation, Hamm’s 
allegations are linked either to his coworkers’ perceptions of his work performance or his sexual 
orientation.”). 
 125.   See, e.g., Anderson v. Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 431898, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 
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given the EEOC’s Baldwin decision the weight it deserves under either 
the Chevron or Skidmore tests.  All of these routes ignore the logical 
arguments for expanding the protection of Title VII and further 
complicate the situation.  For this reason, these cases should not be 
viewed as dispositive on the issue of Title VII and sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
1. Problematic Precedent 
Some courts have held that claims based on sexual orientation 
discrimination are not cognizable under Title VII based on earlier 
precedent.126  For example, the Second Circuit, in Omnicom, stated that 
the district court’s analysis was incorrect purely because previous cases 
had found that “being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not 
constitute nonconformity with a gender stereotype that can give rise to a 
cognizable gender stereotyping claim,” without any explanation as to 
why this is.127  Further, neither of the two prior cases to which the court 
referred explain why the idea that women should date men and men 
should date women does not qualify as sex-based stereotypes.128  In fact, 
one of the cases, Simonton v. Runyon, states that the plaintiff “relies on 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins to argue that the abuse he suffered was 
discrimination based on sexual stereotypes, which may be cognizable as 
discrimination based on sex.”129  The court found “this argument more 
substantial than Simonton’s previous two arguments, but not sufficiently 
pled in this case,” and that the court therefore “express[ed] no opinion as 
to how this issue would be decided in a future case in which it is squarely 
presented and sufficiently pled.”130 
The other case that the Omnicom court relied on was Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble.131  Not surprisingly, the court here also stated that 
                                                            
Feb. 8, 2010). 
 126.   Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255; Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d at 199. 
 127.   Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d at 201 (first citing Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 
211 (2d Cir. 2005); then citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)).  The Second 
Circuit recently overruled both Dawson and Simonton.  See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 
100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 128.   Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218, 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that sexual orientation claims can 
easily be styled as sex-stereotyping claims before noting the absence of evidence that any hostility 
the plaintiff suffered was attributable to her non-conforming dress style); Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37–
38 (avoiding the issue as the plaintiff did not assert sufficient facts or make the argument in the 
lower court). 
 129.   Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37 (citation omitted). 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   398 F.3d 211. 
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“gender stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an 
adjudicator.”132  This is for the simple reason that “[s]tereotypical notions 
about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur 
into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.”133  While Dawson 
is more thorough on this point than Simonton, the court focuses much of 
its analysis on the idea that gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals are 
“using” the gender stereotyping theory to “hide” their “unprotected” 
sexual orientation claims.134  However, again, the court does not consider 
whether a claim under Title VII based on sexual orientation 
discrimination is necessarily a gender-stereotyping claim, other than to 
state simply that it is not.135  Therefore, the court should not have 
considered Simonton and Dawson dispositive on the issue of whether 
sexual orientation is a sex-based stereotype leading to a cognizable claim 
under Title VII. 
The EEOC’s opinion in Baldwin, criticizing the Seventh Circuit 
before its en banc Hively decision, also illustrates the precedent problem.  
There, the EEOC stated: 
A review of cases cited for the proposition that sexual orientation is 
excluded from Title VII reveals that many courts simply cite earlier and 
dated decisions without any additional analysis.  For example, in a brief 
to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals requesting rehearing based on 
various broad declaratory statements that Title VII does not cover 
sexual orientation, the EEOC pointed out that only one previous 
Seventh Circuit case had analyzed the question of coverage of sexual 
orientation discrimination under Title VII and that case, decided in 
1984, had not been reviewed in light of subsequent decisions such as 
Price Waterhouse.  Instead, a string of Seventh Circuit panel decisions 
had simply reiterated the holding in the first case without any further 
discussion.136 
Court opinions that merely contain conclusory statements without 
reasoning or justification, are hardly valuable precedent. Thus, Federal 
Courts of Appeals, when possible, should feel empowered to overturn 
precedent that does not engage in meaningful analysis considering Price 
Waterhouse, Oncale, and Baldwin. 
                                                            
 132.   Id. at 218. 
 133.   Id. (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). 
 134.   See id. at 218–19. 
 135.   See id. at 217–18 (noting that the court is unsure which allegations relate to the plaintiff’s 
gender stereotype versus her sexual orientation claim). 
 136.   Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 n.11 (EEOC July 15, 2015). 
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2. Sexual Orientation as the Deciding Factor 
Some have approached the post-Price Waterhouse “confusion” of 
sex stereotyping and sexual orientation by viewing all sex-stereotyping 
claims brought by gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals as sexual 
orientation discrimination cases in disguise.137  Thus, where a man is 
fired for wearing nail polish, he would have a sex-stereotyping claim 
under Title VII only if he were straight, while a gay man would not be 
protected.  Judge Posner addresses this odd conclusion in his 
concurrence in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod.138  Judge Posner points 
out that the court’s “extension” of Price Waterhouse would mean “that 
the law protects effeminate men from employment discrimination, but 
only if they are (or are believed to be) heterosexuals” and that “to impute 
such a distinction to the authors of Title VII is to indulge in a most 
extravagant legal fiction.”139  Courts, including the Supreme Court, 
should not continue down this “absurd” path and should instead adopt 
the logical reasoning used in Baldwin and Hively. 
3. Stereotyping by the Court 
A similar and equally odd path that some courts have taken is to 
decide sex-stereotyping claims based on whether the stereotype is one 
typically associated with gay men or lesbian women.140  Courts engaging 
in this type of analysis would hold that if the stereotype is one associated 
with gay men or lesbian women then there is no claim under Title VII.141  
For example, the now-overturned Hively panel pointed out that a Florida 
court held that “because a gay employee had a lisp, and a lisp is a 
stereotype associated with gay men rather than women, the 
discrimination the employee faced was not because of sex,” and 
                                                            
 137.   See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016) (“As we 
will describe below, courts have gone about this task in different ways—either by disallowing any 
claims where sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are intertwined, (and, for some courts, 
by not allowing claims from lesbian, gay, or bisexual employees at all), or by trying to tease apart 
the two claims and focusing only on the gender stereotype allegations.  In both methods, the 
opinions tend to turn circles around themselves because, in fact, it is exceptionally difficult to 
distinguish between these two types of claims.”), rev’d en banc sub nom. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 138.   Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., 
concurring), abrogated by Hively, 853 F.3d 339. 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Hively, 830 F.3d at 698 (citing Anderson v. Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 
431898, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010)); Patti, supra note 37, at 141 (noting cases dismissed because 
plaintiffs did not display a sufficient number of stereotypes). 
 141.  Hively, 830 F.3d at 709 (citing Napolitano, 2010 WL 431898, at *6). 
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therefore not cognizable under Title VII.142  Here, a gay man mocked for 
his lisp does not have a cognizable claim under Title VII but a gay man 
mocked for wearing lipstick does.143  Such a distinction is entirely 
arbitrary and does not fulfill the purpose of Title VII.144  Continuing to 
separate sex stereotyping from sexual orientation will only encourage 
courts to engage in this kind of absurd analysis.  Instead, courts should 
simply look to the rational statutory construction of the statute and find 
that Title VII protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
4. The EEOC’s Deserved Deference 
The EEOC and its decision in Baldwin are entitled to some deference 
by the federal courts in interpreting Title VII, and more specifically, the 
questions of whether it prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  As stated above, courts analyzing questions of Title VII 
interpretation could use one of two tests to determine the level of 
deference that should be afforded to EEOC decisions: the Chevron or 
Skidmore deference tests.145  Because the Supreme Court’s instruction on 
deciding which test to use is not entirely clear, there is a possibility, 
although slight, that the EEOC’s Baldwin interpretation could be given 
Chevron deference.146  This is because the Barnhart factors, as applied to 
Baldwin, weigh in favor of Chevron deference.147  Nevertheless, because 
the EEOC rules and regulations do not have the “force of law,” it seems 
unlikely that, after Mead and Omnicom, Baldwin would be given 
controlling weight by the Court.148  But, if the Court chose to focus on 
the Barnhart factors, the Baldwin decision would be entitled to deference 
under the Chevron test, as the EEOC’s interpretation in Baldwin meets 
                                                            
 142.   Patti, supra note 37, at 140–41 (citing Hively, 830 F.3d at 709). 
 143.   Id. 
 144.   See Peter Brandon Bayer, Debunking Unequal Burdens, Trivial Violations, Harmless 
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[https://perma.cc/P4FF-TNZU]))). 
 145.   See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
 146.   Merrill & Watts, supra note 83, at 480 (noting that Chevron and Mead permit agencies to 
adopt rules and regulations, not legislative rules). 
 147.   Nelson, supra note 81, at 263–67. 
 148.   Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (applying Skidmore deference 
because Congress had not granted the EEOC authority to enact rules and regulations interpreting 
Title VII). 
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most of these factors.149 
Even if a court does not believe the Baldwin decision passes the 
Chevron test, it should still give the decision a considerable amount of 
weight under the Skidmore test.  Under Skidmore, an interpretation is 
entitled to some, but less than controlling, weight.150  While not 
controlling, these interpretations “do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.”151  As mentioned above, the weight of such interpretations is 
determined by the following factors: “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.”152  These factors weigh heavily in favor of Baldwin and, as 
such, the court should give the EEOC’s interpretation great weight. 
The first, second, and fourth factors weigh in favor of the Baldwin 
decision.  While these factors, especially the first two, are rather 
subjective, the Baldwin decision appears to be thorough and well-
reasoned, relying on substantial precedent and addressing both cases that 
support its decisions and cases that have disagreed with it.153  
Additionally, the fact that many cases disagreeing with Baldwin do so on 
the basis of pre-Price Waterhouse precedent and flawed uses of 
stereotyping only further shows that Baldwin’s reasoning is more valid 
than the awkward analysis these courts are attempting to apply.154  
Lastly, the en banc Hively court used the same reasoning as Baldwin and 
specifically mentioned the Baldwin decision as instructive.155  This only 
adds to the Baldwin decision’s power to persuade. 
The third factor, however, is less helpful to Baldwin’s reasoning.  
Unfortunately, the EEOC has not been consistent in its interpretation of 
Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition, which Baldwin addresses.156  
However, because three of the four Skidmore factors weigh in favor of 
giving weight to Baldwin, courts should still give ample weight to this 
EEOC decision. 
                                                            
 149.   Nelson, supra note 81, at 263–67 (noting that three of the five Barnhart factors weigh in 
favor of Chevron deference). 
 150.   Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 151.   Id. 
 152.   Id. 
 153.   Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8–9, *8 n.11 (EEOC July 15, 
2015). 
 154.   See supra Sections IV.A.1–3. 
 155.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
Compare id., with Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2. 
 156.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *9 n.13. 
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While Baldwin should be given some weight by courts, the level of 
deference it ultimately receives is not dispositive here.  Even absent 
some deference, courts should still reach Baldwin’s conclusion through 
their own reasoning.  However, if a court is equally swayed by 
arguments for and against including sexual orientation in Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination, the weight given to the Baldwin 
interpretation could and indeed should certainly tip the scales in favor of 
inclusion. 
B. Interpreting Title VII: Plain Meaning, Sex Stereotyping, and the 
Associational Theory 
When the Supreme Court addresses the interpretation of Title VII, it 
should hold that the sex discrimination prohibition includes 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  First, the plain meaning of 
the statute bans such discrimination.  Second, discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is discrimination based on sex stereotyping and 
therefore violates Title VII under Price Waterhouse.  Third, under the 
Associational Theory and Loving v. Virginia, discrimination based on the 
sex of one’s partner violates Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination.  Fourth, although the Court may expand Title VII beyond 
the specific meaning members of Congress may have had in mind when 
they passed the Act, the Court should interpret Title VII in line with its 
broad original purpose of providing equality and protection from 
discrimination in the workplace.  Lastly, the Court should consider the 
important policy reasons for holding that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
1. Plain Meaning 
To determine the plain meaning of Title VII, we must look to the text 
in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute.  
The plain meaning of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
includes a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
Perhaps the most basic canon of statutory construction is that where the 
plain language of a statute is clear, a court must give it effect.157  Title 
VII clearly states that discrimination “because of . . . sex” is 
                                                            
 157.   See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 536 (1947).  See also Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) 
(“If the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent . . . 
[t]he inquiry ceases.’” (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002))). 
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prohibited.158  It is true that regarding plain meaning, “the cases speak of 
the ‘meaning of common understanding,’ ‘the normal and spontaneous 
meaning of language,’ ‘the common and appropriate use,’ ‘the natural 
straightforward and literal sense,’ and similar variants.”159  However, 
considering the extent of adjudication on Title VII, the question is not 
simply what the common person considers the definition of “sex” to be 
but rather “how to interpret the statute in light of the guidance the 
Supreme Court has provided.”160  The Hively Court addressed the 
argument that the common meaning of “sex” does not include sexual 
orientation, stating that “the dissent postulates that it is implausible that a 
reasonable person in 1964 could have understood discrimination based 
on sex to include sexual orientation discrimination.  But that reasonable 
person similarly may not have understood it to include sexual 
harassment,” which the Supreme Court has maintained is part of sex 
discrimination since at least 1986.161 
In Price Waterhouse, the Court held that the prohibition on sex 
discrimination means that an employer may not make employment 
decisions based on “sex-based considerations.”162  Further, Justice 
Ginsburg spoke to the plain meaning of Title VII in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., when she stated that “the critical issue, Title VII’s text 
indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex 
are not exposed.”163 
Sexual orientation discrimination fits both of these definitions.  First, 
sexual orientation is inherently a “sex-based consideration” because one 
cannot define a person as gay, lesbian, or bisexual without first knowing 
that person’s sex.164  Thus, it is impossible to say that an employer was 
able to discriminate based on the sexual orientation of an employee 
without considering that employee’s sex.165  To attempt to separate 
sexual orientation from sex is simply an attempt to restrict unnecessarily 
                                                            
 158.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 159.   Frankfurter, supra note 157, at 536. 
 160.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 n.5. 
 161.   Id. 
 162.   490 U.S. 228, 239, 241–42 (1989) (stating a plaintiff suing under Title VII must prove the 
defendant relied on sex-based considerations); see Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 
4397641, at *4–5 (EEOC July 15, 2015) (relying on Price Waterhouse and finding that sexual 
orientation is a sex-based consideration). 
 163.   510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 164.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5. 
 165.   See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346–47, 349 (discussing associational discrimination); Baldwin, 
2015 WL 4397641, at *5–6. 
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the application of the plain language of Title VII.  Second, fitting with 
Justice Ginsburg’s reiteration of the plain meaning of Title VII, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation treats two similarly situated 
employees differently based only on their sex.166  That is, when an 
employer fires a male employee married to another male but retains a 
female employee married to a male, that employer treats those similarly 
situated individuals differently purely because of the their sex.167  If the 
former employee had been a female, she would not have been fired.  
Thus, the cases mentioned above have shown that the plain meaning of 
“because of . . . sex” in Title VII is any discrimination relying on “sex-
based considerations” or any treatment that leaves a member of one sex 
at a disadvantage when a member of the opposite sex would not be.  
Under that meaning, it is clear that to discriminate against a person based 
on his or her sexual orientation is to discriminate based on sex. 
Some critics have attempted to reason that the “similarly situated 
individuals” that the court should be comparing in this case are a gay 
man and a lesbian woman, rather than a gay man and a straight 
woman.168  By pointing out that both a gay man and a lesbian woman 
would be treated the same by an employer discriminating based on 
sexual orientation, the employer cannot be discriminating “because 
of . . . sex” under Title VII.169  This argument was also made regarding 
interracial marriage—that a white man married to a black woman and a 
black man married to a white woman were discriminated against 
equally.170  Such arguments were disposed of in Loving v. Virginia, 
which directly stated that such arguments were “a limited view of the 
Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the 
subsequent decisions of this Court.”171  Similarly, the Court should 
dispose of such arguments with regard to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, as the Seventh Circuit did in Hively.172 
2. The Sex-Stereotyping Theory 
Further, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to protect 
                                                            
 166.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5–6. 
 167.   See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202–04 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, 
J., concurring), abrogated by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 168.   See Hively, 853 F.3d at 366–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 169.   See id. at 367–69. 
 170.   Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). 
 171.   Id. at 10 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964)). 
 172.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 348–49. 
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against discrimination based on failure to conform to sex stereotypes.173  
As mentioned above, Price Waterhouse found that “[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”174  This undoubtedly 
includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The idea that men 
should marry women and women should marry men is perhaps one of the 
most prevalent gender stereotypes in the United States today.175  The 
EEOC addressed this in Baldwin, where it stated that 
[S]tereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our 
stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women . . . . The harasser 
may discriminate against an openly gay co-worker, or a co-worker that 
he perceives to be gay, whether effeminate or not, because he thinks, 
‘real’ men should date women, and not other men.176 
Courts that have held Title VII does not protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation ignore this truth and struggle to apply the 
Price Waterhouse holding.177 
Turning back to the Eleventh and Second Circuit opinions in Evans 
and Omnicom, where courts attempt to separate sexual orientation from 
sex-based stereotypes, the analysis is confusing and awkward.  In 
Omnicom, for example, the court noted that “the district court’s decision 
draws attention to some confusion in our Circuit about the relationship 
between gender stereotyping and sexual orientation discrimination 
claims,”178 and that: 
In its decision, the district court described at length difficulties in 
distinguishing sexual orientation discrimination claims from gender 
stereotyping claims, specifically noting that negative views people hold 
of those with certain sexual orientations may be based on stereotypes 
about appropriate romantic associations between men and women.179 
                                                            
 173.   Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989). 
 174.   Id. at 251 (quoting City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 
n.13 (1978)). 
 175.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (noting that modern American society views heterosexuality as the 
norm and homosexuality as the exception). 
 176.   Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 (EEOC July 15, 2015) 
(quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)). 
 177.   See, e.g., Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam), abrogated by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 178.   Id. at 200. 
 179.   Id. (citing Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 619–20 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016)). 
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Thus, courts recognize that it is difficult and unsatisfying to attempt to 
interpret Title VII along with Price Waterhouse in a way that leaves 
discrimination based on sexual orientation out of Title VII’s scope.180  
Luckily, however, there is a rational alternative: to accept the logical 
conclusion of the combination of Title VII’s text and Price Waterhouse’s 
guidance—like the EEOC in Baldwin and the Seventh Circuit in 
Hively—and determine that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
discrimination based on sex-based stereotypes and therefore prohibited 
by the Act. 
3. The Associational Theory 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination also includes the 
prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation because 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation is “associational 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”181  Title VII “on its face treats each 
of the enumerated categories exactly the same.”182  That is, whether an 
employer discriminates based on race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin, the analysis by the court should be the same, and the principles 
held by the Supreme Court about one of the categories apply to the other 
categories.183  Thus, in determining how to interpret “sex” as used in 
Title VII, one must also consider how the Court has interpreted other 
enumerated categories. 
Here, courts have repeatedly found that “the statute prohibits 
discrimination based on an employee’s association with a person of 
another race, such as an interracial marriage or friendship.”184  This 
theory of interpreting discrimination based on race began with Loving v. 
Virginia, which found a ban on interracial marriage to be 
unconstitutional.185  Federal courts have since found the same to apply 
when interpreting Title VII.186  For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Parr 
v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co. found that when “a plaintiff 
claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, 
                                                            
 180.   Id.; see also id. at 205–06 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 181.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6. 
 182.   Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989). 
 183.   See id. (“By the same token, our specific references to gender throughout this opinion, and 
the principles we announce, apply with equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or 
national origin.”). 
 184.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (citing various EEOC and circuit opinions). 
 185.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citing 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 186.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–48 (discussing various cases). 
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he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because 
of his race.”187  The Second Circuit agreed with this analysis in Holcomb 
v. Iona College where it found that discrimination against an employee 
because of his interracial association was “because of the employee’s 
own race.”188 
This analysis applies equally to discrimination against those 
individuals who have entered into same sex relationships.189  Title VII 
prohibits employers from “treating an employee or applicant differently 
than other employees or applicants based on the fact that such 
individuals are in a same-sex marriage or because the employee has a 
personal association with someone of a particular sex.”190  Thus, the 
employer who fires a woman for being married to a woman discriminates 
against the employee because of her own sex, just as the employer who 
fires a white man for marrying a black woman discriminates against him 
because of his race.191  Therefore the Supreme Court should apply the 
Associational Theory to find that the employer who discriminates based 
on sexual orientation engages in “associational discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”192 
4. Interpreting Title VII in Line with the Original Purpose 
Even if the Court were to decide that the statutory construction of 
Title VII laid out above was not clear enough, the intent of Title VII also 
leads to the conclusion that the Act prohibits discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.  The question of congressional intent is not so narrow 
as to only include exactly what was in the minds of members of 
Congress when they passed the statute in question.193  Considering the 
purpose of Title VII in 1964, it still seems that a prohibition of 
                                                            
 187.   791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). 
 188.   521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
 189.   See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (Title VII covers all 
protected classes equally); Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (noting that it is immaterial to the court’s analysis 
that Loving addressed racial discrimination); Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (stating that Title 
VII’s protections apply the same to gender as they do to race). 
 190.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7. 
 191.   See Parr, 791 F.2d at 892; Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139. 
 192.   Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6. 
 193.   Frankfurter, supra note 157, at 539 (“[Statutory purpose] is what the judge must seek and 
effectuate, and he ought not to be led off the trail by tests that have overtones of subjective design.  
We are not concerned with anything subjective.  We do not delve into the mind [sic] of legislators or 
their draftsmen, or committee members.”); see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 n.5 (2017) (“[W]e are 
concerned with the provisions of the law, not the principal concerns of those who wrote it.” (citing 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998))). 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation would be included in that 
goal.  In fact, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, he stated that “the purpose of the law is simple. . . . 
[T]he only limit to a man’s hope for happiness . . . shall be his own 
ability.”194  Of course this is limited to those categories listed in the 
statute—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin;195 however, the 
stated purpose remains broad. 
Further, as mentioned above, although Congress added the sex 
amendment of Title VII later, and therefore less legislative history exists 
to consider, the ultimate point of adding the amendment was to make 
coverage of the Act as comprehensive as possible.196  Both the stated 
purpose, as well as that which can be discovered from the history of the 
sex amendment, point to an act that provides comprehensive coverage 
within the enumerated categories, and the courts should seek to provide 
this in their analyses. 
However, the Court is not limited to the specific purpose in the heads 
of legislators at the time that Title VII passed in deciphering the purpose 
of the statute.  Rather, 
[T]he purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which Congress 
should have enacted, or would have.  It is that which it did enact, 
however inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the 
statute, even if a specific manifestation was not thought of, as is often 
the very reason for casting a statute in very general terms.197 
The Hively court makes a similar argument addressing the dissent’s 
position that Congress, acting in 1964, could not have intended to protect 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation, stating that “[a]s 
Oncale said, we are concerned with the provisions of the law, not the 
principal concerns of those who wrote it.”198  Oncale also stated that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils.”199  The Supreme Court has consistently 
held this position with regard to Title VII, choosing on many occasions 
                                                            
 194.   Bayer, supra note 144, at 402 (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson, Radio & Television 
Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 842, 843 (July 2, 1964) (transcript 
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 199.   Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
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to apply it in ways that the Congress in 1964 may not have intended.200  
Here, discrimination because of sexual orientation is at the very least a 
reasonably comparable evil to that of discrimination because of sex.  
Thus, considering both the intent of Title VII to provide comprehensive 
protection and the provision’s reasonable applicability to sexual 
orientation discrimination, the Supreme Court should find that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation. 
5. Public Policy Favors Inclusion 
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is also beneficial from a policy 
point of view for two reasons.  First, determining the meaning of sex 
discrimination under Title VII would clarify an area of law currently in 
flux in a manner consistent with our nation’s changing values and, 
second, ensure that LGBTQ individuals in all parts of the nation are 
afforded the same protection under the law. 
First, determining that the Title VII prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of sex includes sexual orientation discrimination would make 
Title VII application uniform throughout the nation and will bring Title 
VII law into conformity with other areas of law that protect gay, lesbian 
and bisexual individuals.  Citizens in all jurisdictions should be able to 
enjoy the protections of federal law equally regardless of their location. 
Further, an interpretation by the Supreme Court that finds Title VII 
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination would also bring the 
application of Title VII into conformity with other areas of law regarding 
LGBTQ individuals in the United States.  Consider, for example, Romer 
v. Evans, which found that “a provision of the Colorado Constitution 
forbidding any organ of government in the state from taking action 
designed to protect ‘homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual’ persons violated 
the federal Equal Protection Clause.”201  Or, consider Lawrence v. Texas, 
where the Court invalidated a Texas statute making same-sex intimacy 
criminal.202  Additionally, United States v. Windsor found the Defense of 
Marriage Act’s definition of “spouse,” which did not recognize same sex 
partners, unconstitutional, and, of course, Obergefell v. Hodges found 
that “the right to marry is a fundamental liberty right, protected by the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
                                                            
 200.   See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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662 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
Amendment.”203  While these cases speak to the violation of 
constitutional provisions and not the application of Title VII, they show a 
fundamental view that gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans are entitled 
to the same protection as their straight counterparts.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court should end this inconsistency and find that under Title VII, 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual Americans are entitled to protection under 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court will eventually face the decision of whether Title 
VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . sex” includes 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  When that time comes, the 
Court should find that it does.  The background explored in this comment 
shows that not only has the history of the prohibition of sex 
discrimination in Title VII history been misunderstood and used to 
unduly restrict Title VII application, but also that the Supreme Court has 
been interpreting Title VII to apply broadly for a number of years.204  
Furthermore, this Comment has noted the modern arguments for and 
against protection under Title VII against sexual orientation 
discrimination.  The analysis then addressed the issue of precedent and 
argued that the Federal Circuit Courts could and should be willing to, 
when possible, overrule precedent that often fails to engage in the 
meaningful analysis required after Oncale and Price Waterhouse. 
Even if the circuit courts do not change their stance on the issue of 
Title VII protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
the Supreme Court should.  The Court should consider that the plain 
meaning and original purpose of Title VII, combined with Price 
Waterhouse and Loving precedents relating to sex-stereotyping and 
associational discrimination lead to the conclusion that Title VII 
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. 
There are also important policy reasons to decide the issue at hand as 
laid out above.  A prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination would 
afford all Americans the same protection under the law regardless of 
their sexual orientation or their location.205  A diverse workplace is a 
productive and effective workplace.  LGBTQ individuals make 
important contributions to American businesses and employers should 
                                                            
 203.   Id. at 349–50 (first citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013); then 
citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2548, 2604 (2015)). 
 204.   See supra Part III. 
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not exclude them from the workplace purely because of their sexuality.  
It is time that the Supreme Court recognize that Title VII’s prohibition on 
sex discrimination includes a prohibition on discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. 
 
